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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Challenge of Originalism does many things well: it 
showcases the sophistication of current originalist scholarship; it 
displays the resonance that originalist arguments have with 
diverse and international audiences; and it reminds us that 
originalists are far from having won the debate. The Challenge of 
Originalism brings together some of the leading lights of 
originalist scholarship, and puts them in conversation with each 
other and with prominent critics. 
The Challenge of Originalism also, as all collections must, 
leaves out some important topics. Most prominent is original-
ism’s relationship to nonoriginalist precedent, a subject of 
significant scholarly interest over the past ten years. Also, The 
Challenge of Originalism introduces some of the key recent 
originalist moves, such as incorporating the concept of con-
stitutional construction, without fully elucidating them. 
The essays in The Challenge of Originalism are consistently 
nuanced and thought-provoking. The Challenge of Originalism 
includes introductory material to originalism and the debates 
surrounding it, and its consistently high level of sophistication 
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also makes it valuable to scholars already engaged in these 
debates. 
In Part II, I first describe the important contributions made 
by and in The Challenge of Originalism. In particular, The 
Challenge of Originalism showcases originalism’s sophistication 
and broad appeal. Then, in Part III, I suggest two important and 
unresolved challenges to originalism: (1) fully explaining the 
nature and scope of constitutional construction; and (2) 
describing what role, if any, nonoriginalist precedent retains in 
originalism. I end, in Part IV, by suggesting that the essays 
exemplify the chief reason for originalism’s continuing and 
broad-based allure—the reason it presents a challenge—the 
Constitution’s writtenness. 
II. THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 
A. ORIGINALISM’S SOPHISTICATION 
The Challenge of Originalism is primarily composed of 
essays that—among other things they do well—exhibit 
originalism’s increasing sophistication. The first three chapters 
present a description of originalism, its origin and current state 
(pp. 12–41, 70–86), along with a defense of originalism (pp. 42–
69). Chapters four and five provide a window into the newly-
reinvigorated original intent originalism position (pp. 87–119), 
and chapter six displays the potential impact of the adoption of 
original meaning originalism in the context of Canadian 
constitutional law (pp. 120–46). Chapters seven through nine 
exemplify the role that constitutional settlement plays and can 
play in justifications of originalism (pp. 147–222). Lastly, chap-
ters ten through twelve contain critiques—some sympathetic and 
some not—of originalism, especially its original meaning version 
(pp. 223–99). 
Both the originalists and their critics in The Challenge of 
Originalism powerfully deploy a wide variety of concepts, 
distinctions, and arguments. For this reason, The Challenge of 
Originalism is not solely for the newly initiated.4 Lawrence 
Solum’s essay, “What is Originalism? The Evolution of 
Contemporary Originalist Theory,” is appropriately first in the 
collection because it provides a clear introduction to 
 
 4. The essays are well written and describe originalism’s complexity in an 
accessible manner.  
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originalism’s theoretical evolution over the past forty years (pp. 
12–41). He first introduces readers to originalism’s various 
incarnations: original intent, original understanding, original 
meaning, and original methods (pp. 16–26). Then, Solum 
describes the major intellectual moves made by (many) 
originalists to advance originalism: the distinction between 
original applications and original meaning; the distinction 
between constitutional interpretation and construction; and the 
fixation and contribution theses (pp. 23–26, 33–36). Solum’s own 
most important additions are the fixation and contribution 
theses (pp. 33–36). 
The best example of originalism’s increased intricacy, on 
display in The Challenge of Originalism, is the concept of 
constitutional construction. As described by Solum, construction 
“determin[es] the legal effect of the constitutional text” (p. 23). 
This concept is one of the key moves made by those originalists 
who advocate original meaning originalism,5 and it is tied to a 
host of other concepts, such as legal underdeterminacy6 (p. 23). 
For instance, Jeffrey Goldsworthy states that “interpretation is 
frequently unable to resolve interpretative problems raised by 
constitutions that . . . are often ambiguous, vague, contradictory, 
insufficiently explicit, or even silent” (p. 60). 
Many of the “new originalists” place a lot of weight—
perhaps too much7—on construction. For example, Keith 
Whittington argues that originalism can accommodate much of 
the “pluralism” in constitutional argumentation within the 
concept of construction (pp. 79, 82). When the Constitution’s 
original meaning is underdetermined, according to Whittington, 
originalists may resort to the various “modalities” of 
constitutional argumentation, but in a manner “carefully 
disciplined by the overarching interpretative enterprise” (p. 79). 
 
 5. Though, there is no necessary reason why originalists of other stripes, such as 
advocates of original intent originalism, could not make the same move. See, e.g., 
Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 719–25 (2009) (arguing that original meaning originalism is 
relatively more open to underdeterminacy than original intent originalism). Original 
methods originalists have suggested that their conception of originalism “resolve[s]” 
constitutional ambiguity and vagueness, and would therefore eliminate the necessary 
precondition for employing construction. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752–53 (2009).  
 6. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical 
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (providing the seminal definition of 
underdeterminacy).  
 7. I suggest below, in Part III, how this may be the case.  
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Similarly, Goldsworthy claims that, within constitutional 
construction, “judges may be forced to act creatively and . . . 
consider[] matters such as consistency with general legal 
doctrines and principles, public policy, and justice” (p. 61). 
Indeed, Lawrence Solum labels original meaning originalists’ 
embrace of construction “perhaps their most important move” 
(p. 23), and for two reasons: (1) originalism is more descriptively 
plausible when it “acknowledges . . . the fact of constitutional 
underdeterminacy”; and (2) constitutional construction “open[s] 
the door for reconciliation between originalism and living 
constitutionalism”8 (pp. 23–24). 
The Challenge of Originalism also provides a helpful 
introduction to the intricate intra-originalism debate over 
original intent and original meaning. Lawrence Solum, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, and Keith Whittington represent the original 
meaning camp. Goldsworthy directly argues in favor of original 
meaning originalism (pp. 46–51), and Solum and Whittington 
describe the benefits originalists reap from its adoption (pp. 12–
41, 70–86). For example, as noted, Solum suggests that original 
meaning originalism “opened the door for reconciliation 
between originalism and living constitutionalism” (p. 24). 
Original intent originalists, represented in The Challenge of 
Originalism by Larry Alexander and Stanley Fish, are direct in 
their support for original intent originalism and criticism of 
original meaning originalism (pp. 87–119). Although originalism 
is currently most prominently associated with original meaning,9 
advocates of original intent have continued to proffer strong 
cases for original intent and criticisms of original meaning.10 
Alexander’s and Fish’s contributions are no exception. 
Alexander, for instance, offers a host of arguments: original 
intent better fits how humans interpret other texts (pp. 87–89); 
the common reasons for adopting original meaning are 
unpersuasive (pp. 90–91); and original intent best fits 
 
 8. For Professor Solum’s more recent published thoughts on such a reconciliation 
see Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of 
Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011), and 
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)).  
 9. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 
(2004) (providing a thorough summary of the widespread move to original meaning).  
 10. Other prominent original intent originalists include: Richard S. Kay, Adherence 
to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 
82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988), and Saikrishna Prakash. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna 
Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an 
Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004).  
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interpretation of the actual document in the National Archives 
instead of another—possibly hypothetical—document (pp. 93–
95).11 
Originalism’s sophistication is also displayed in the complex 
exchanges between the originalists and their critics. Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy’s contribution, “The Case for Originalism,” is a 
clearly presented articulation of “[t]he best argument for 
originalism” (p. 42). Goldsworthy lists and then defends eight 
propositions, each of which builds on earlier ones (pp. 42–67). 
For example, Proposition 1 is: “A Constitution, like any other 
law, necessarily has a meaning that pre-exists judicial 
interpretation of it” (p. 44) (emphasis omitted). Goldsworthy 
responds to criticisms of this proposition from a number of 
sources, including prominent critic of originalism, Mitchell 
Berman (pp. 44–46). 
The Challenge of Originalism contains three critical essays, 
by Steven D. Smith, Mitchell N. Berman, and Brian H. Bix. 
Berman’s essay is the most directly confrontational and, in 
Berman’s exchanges with his interlocutors, the reader witnesses 
an impressive display of erudition (by both parties). For 
example, Berman and Solum both describe what Solum calls the 
“contribution thesis” of originalism—that the Constitution’s 
original meaning contributes to constitutional law—and the 
nuanced distinction between the Constitution’s semantic content 
and its legal content (pp. 32–38, 257 n.17). 
Another example occurs later in Berman’s essay, where he 
offers a coherentist criticism of originalism. Rooted in the 
method of a reflective equilibrium, Berman argues that 
originalism cannot account for Americans’ case-specific constitu-
tional judgments, such as the wide-spread intuition that John 
McCain was eligible to be president despite the Natural Born 
Citizenship Clause’s contrary original meaning (pp. 258–73). To 
this line of argument, Alexander “den[ies] . . . that one does or 
can have constitutional or legal intuitions that pre-exist” (p. 97). 
In turn, Berman attempts to rebut Alexander’s point (pp. 268 
n.49). 
 
 11. Many of Alexander’s claims resonate with those of Richard Kay. Kay, supra 
note 5, at 714–19; see also Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 29–33 (Larry Alexander ed., 
1998) (arguing that original intent originalism is required because it best facilitates 
“implementation of a regime of constitutional restraints . . . created by the constitution-
makers”).  
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Bix’s essay, “Constitutions, Originalism, and Meaning,” 
sounds in the vein of constructive criticism. Bix, for instance, 
suggests that one of the key original meaning originalist moves—
to distinguish constitutional meaning from expected applications 
of that meaning—may fail to take into account the normative 
context of law (pp. 286–91). Bix argues that, instead, meaning 
and application are often related in complicated ways and, if that 
is the case, then originalists’ clean distinction between inter-
pretation and construction may be vulnerable. 
Smith’s essay, “That Old-Time Originalism” (pp. 223–45), is 
perhaps the most intriguing of all, from an originalist’s 
perspective. Smith characterizes himself as “an originalist 
sympathizer” who counsels that originalism’s increased sophis-
tication—so prominently displayed throughout The Challenge of 
Originalism—is, or is partly, a negative development. After 
detailing some of the ways originalist theory has become more 
elaborate, Smith argues that originalism’s increased—
“scholasticized,” Smith says—sophistication has its costs. In 
particular, Smith identifies “exclusion and dissolution”: 
exclusion of everyone but the most determined and intelligent 
from the debate, and dissolution of originalism as a coherent 
position on constitutional interpretation (pp. 227–33). Below, 
and in Part IV, I expand on Smith’s suggestion that originalism’s 
sophistication is harming originalism. 
Given Smith’s reliance on and analogy to the Christian 
tradition, I wonder if that same tradition suggests a possible 
distinction between Smith’s two identified costs of originalism’s 
increasing sophistication. First, one could argue that, as 
Christian theologians developed and adopted more sophisticated 
tools, the gap between theologians and average Christians 
widened, with the likely exclusion of average Christians from 
high-end theological discussions. This is a cost, but one that 
nearly all Christian denominations have thought worth bearing,12 
and for good reason. Theological erudition is not a prerequisite 
to being a good Christian,13 and Christian churches have found 
that theological sophistication provides a host of benefits, such 
as greater insight into Divine Truth.14 
 
 12. Some descendants of the Radical Reformation constitute rare exceptions. 
KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 788–90 (1953).  
 13. John Henry Cardinal Newman articulated this claim in JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, 
AN ESSAY IN AID OF A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT 123–31 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 
1979) (1870).  
 14. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE 
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Similarly, sophistication in constitutional interpretation is 
not necessary to being a good citizen, lawyer, or judge (or even a 
good legal scholar!).15 And originalism’s increased sophistication 
has yielded significant benefits. For example, originalist 
arguments are taken seriously by the Supreme Court,16 in the 
legal academy,17 and have exerted gravitation force even when 
not successful.18 
Second, dissolution has clearly occurred to and harmed 
Christianity. Christianity’s fragmentation has taken many forms, 
and took place over an extended period of time, but it is unlikely 
that theological sophistication was a major cause, at least of 
Western Christianity’s dissolution in the sixteenth century.19 
Instead, standard accounts of the Reformation cite to a host of 
other factors, such as the personal corruption of many of the 
Church’s leaders and clerics, that contributed to its occurrence.20 
There are deep divisions among originalists over con-
struction,21 nonoriginalist precedent,22 the appropriate form of 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 29–30 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 6th ed. 
1989) (1878) (summarizing his “Theory of the Development of Doctrine”). Of course, 
increased theological sophistication is also a result of the Divine mandate to “be[] ready 
always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you.” 1 Peter 
3:15.  
 15. Smith makes something like this distinction at the end of his essay (p. 244). 
 16. E.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 17. Perhaps the major example of originalism’s prominence in the legal academy is 
Jack Balkin’s adoption of it. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).  
 18. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576–82, 2584–93 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., 
opinion) (coming to conclusions consistent with the Commerce Clause’s original meaning 
without expressly relying on the original meaning and primarily working with and within 
precedent); see also Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 
1, 25 (2013) (describing a facet of originalism’s gravitational effect).  
 19. See, e.g., PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 268–81 (1976) (listing, 
as causes, unseemly wealth within the Church, clerical abuses, dissolution of the 
Thomistic philosophical synthesis, rediscovery of ancient learning, overburdensome 
religious requirements, urbanization, an educated and economically prosperous laity, the 
printing press, nascent nationalism, growth of the state and dynastic ambition, and papal 
insolvency).  
 20. Id.; BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A 
RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 366 (2012) (“The failure of medieval 
Christendom derived . . . from the pervasive, long-standing, and undeniable failure of so 
many Christians, including members of the clergy both high and low, to live by the 
church’s own prescriptions and exhortations based on its truth claims about the Life 
Questions.”); see also EAMON DUFFY, STRIPPING OF THE ALTERS: TRADITIONAL 
RELIGION IN ENGLAND 1400-1580 at 479 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 2005) (1992) 
(attributing the English reformation to the “social and economic prestige of its more 
prosperous or articulate adherents”).  
 21. Some originalists reject construction, some accept a moderate role for 
construction, while others believe that construction plays a robust role.  
 22. Originalists fall on a spectrum, with some originalists accepting little or no 
nonoriginalist precedent, and others accepting some (possibly significant) subset of 
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originalism,23 and the normative justification for originalism.24 
Over each of these four divisions (among others), originalists 
have articulated increasingly complex arguments for and against 
their respective positions. These cleavages potentially pose a 
challenge to originalism’s integrity, in a way similar to the 
debates among Christians during the Reformation. 
However, Smith’s use of “scholastic”—though it carries, in 
Smith’s usage, the conventional negative connotation25—suggests 
an alternative era when incredibly sophisticated and nuanced 
debates proceeded within a context of overarching unity: the 
period of the First Scholasticism.26 The twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries were a period of tremendous intellectual ferment in 
the West, for a host of reasons, and Christian scholars engaged 
each other (and non-Christians) with great erudition—and 
disagreement—while maintaining the overall coherence of their 
perspective. It was not until the Reformation, precipitated by 
causes other than theological sophistication, that Christianity 
fractured. 
Similarly, originalists are engaged with each other (and their 
critics) in a sophisticated debate. There is no necessary reason 
why intra-originalist disagreements must fracture the overall 
 
nonoriginalist precedent.  
 23. The various major forms are: original intent, original understanding, original 
meaning, and original methods.  
 24. There are two general categories of justifications offered by originalists: internal 
and external. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110 (1999). Internal justifications 
accept the premises and facets of the current practice, and argue that originalism is the 
best explanation for that practice. For instance, Professor Whittington claimed that 
originalism is required by our practice’s commitment to a written constitution. Id. 
External justifications, by contrast, argue that originalism does better than alternatives at 
maximizing some good or set of goods. Id. at 110–11. For example, Professor Barnett 
argued that originalism’s “lock-in” of the Constitution’s original meaning best protects 
the original meaning’s ability to protect natural rights. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 109–17 (2004). This 
external” category is similar to Professor Berman’s soft originalism category (pp. 253–
54).  
 25. See also Steven D. Smith, Natural Law and Contemporary Moral Thought: A 
Guide from the Perplexed, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 299, 299 (1997) (using “scholastic” in the 
conventional, negative sense).  
 26. See FERGUS KERR, AFTER AQUINAS: VERSIONS OF THOMISM 8 (2002) 
(“Disputation as a method assumes there will be conflicting interpretations of texts and 
doctrines that need to be exposed, explored and resolved.”); see also ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 222–24, 232–34 (1990) (describing the premodern 
university as one of “[c]reative rational disagreement . . . against a background of 
agreement”); JOSEF PIEPER, SCHOLASTICISM: PERSONALITIES AND PROBLEMS IN 
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (Richard & Clara Winston trans., St. Augustine’s Press 2001) 
(1960) (describing the Scholastic period).  
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originalist perspective. Instead, the Scholastic experience 
suggests that long-term, constrained—though—creative, 
disagreement is possible—and fruitful. 
B. ORIGINALISM’S BROAD RESONANCE 
The Challenge of Originalism also exemplifies originalism’s 
broad resonance with scholars from many different backgrounds. 
Originalist contributors include long-time and relatively recent 
advocates, Americans and scholars from other countries, and 
scholars of varied political backgrounds. Something about 
originalism—the power of its arguments, its fit with pre-existing 
legal, cultural, or social structures, or, potentially, the ideological 
cover it provides—is attracting a variety of scholars. 
In addition to prominent American originalists,27 The 
Challenge of Originalism includes contributions by Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy and James Allan, Australian legal scholars, and 
Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller, Canadian law professors. 
For American scholars who, typically, read American legal 
scholarship, the essays by these scholars are enriching for a 
number of reasons. 
First, the essays by Goldsworthy, Allan, Huscroft, and 
Miller exemplify originalism’s attractiveness to non-American 
scholars.28 For example, Goldsworthy believes that the argument 
in favor of originalist interpretation is “simple, straightforward, 
and powerful” (p. 42). 
Second, the essays by non-American scholars provide new 
and—for American scholars, I suspect—fresh perspectives on 
originalism. For instance, Allan’s argument for originalism 
begins at an unfamiliar place: the hypothetical country of 
Allania, which moved from “a legally unchecked legislature” to 
adoption of a written constitution (p. 181). 
At the same time as The Challenge of Originalism 
exemplifies the breadth of originalism’s resonance, it also 
suggests that originalism’s appeal is limited. The arguments 
made by both the American and non-American scholars focus or 
depend on written constitutions. Most clearly, Grégoire C.N. 
Webber’s essay abstracts from any particular constitution or 
 
 27. In this Volume are chapters by Larry Alexander, Stanley Fish, Lawrence B. 
Solum, and Keith E. Whittington.  
 28. Each author writes against the background of a written constitution, either 
actual, in the cases of Goldsworthy (Australia), Huscroft (Canada), and Miller (Canada), 
or hypothetical (Allan).  
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country in order to ascertain the characteristics of a constitution 
necessary to make originalism an appropriate interpretative 
methodology (pp. 147–78). Webber concludes that originalism 
requires, among other things, a commitment to “an original 
constitution that is written at the founding” (p. 151). 
III. ORIGINALISM’S OWN CHALLENGES 
As The Challenge of Originalism shows, originalism poses a 
significant intellectual challenge, not only in the United States, 
but in other countries (with written constitutions) as well. The 
Challenge of Originalism also, as discussed above, includes a 
number of essays that voice challenges to originalism. In this 
Part, I briefly discuss two additional challenges facing 
originalists: (1) fully explaining the nature and scope of con-
stitutional construction; and (2) describing what role, if any, 
nonoriginalist precedent retains in originalism. Both of these 
challenges share the common, and deeper, problem posed by 
originalism’s fit, or lack thereof, with current legal practice. 
A major hurdle facing originalism, as articulated by original 
meaning originalists, is its significant reliance on constitutional 
construction. Originalists who advocate for constitutional 
construction still have a lot of work to do elucidating con-
struction: what is the evidence that construction is a necessary 
facet of originalism?; when does it occur?; what is the “output” 
of construction?; what relationship does it have to inter-
pretation?; how does one know when or where interpretation 
leaves off and construction begins?; and, what is the relative 
authority of judges, compared to the other branches of the 
federal government,29 when articulating constructions? Until 
these central questions are fully fleshed out, it is reasonable for 
other originalists, and nonoriginalists, to remain skeptical of the 
move, for a host of reasons. 
To focus only on the most basic question—why must 
construction form a part of originalism?—it seems, at least to 
me,30 that the underdeterminacy of constitutional meaning is 
prima facie, a reasonable position. But, what if the best 
conception of originalism contains one or more closure rules 
 
 29. And state governments.  
 30. See Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of 
Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1758–62 (describing the distinction 
between metaphysical and epistemic determinacy of law and how it may support the 
concept of constitutional construction).  
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that, in all (or nearly all) possible cases, result in determinate 
answers to constitutional interpretative questions?31 To date, 
pro-construction originalists have not provided fully fleshed-out 
responses in the legal literature.32 Recognizing this gap, pro-
construction originalists have continued to offer arguments and 
explanation.33 
Despite the broad array of arguments displayed by 
originalists (and their interlocutors) in The Challenge of 
Originalism, some of the outstanding issues with which 
originalists have grappled were not addressed, or were raised 
tangentially. Most prominent among these is the challenge posed 
by nonoriginalist precedent (p. 252 (Berman)). Originalists have 
approached nonoriginalist precedent in a number of ways,34 but 
the reader would not know that from The Challenge of 
Originalism. 
One can describe the challenge posed by nonoriginalist 
precedent in a number of ways. The first way is that, if 
originalism does incorporate some/most/all nonoriginalist 
precedent, then it risks losing (at least some of) what makes it 
distinctive. 
A second way to describe the challenge posed by 
nonoriginalist precedent is that originalism does not adequately 
fit American constitutional law because so much of it is 
composed of nonoriginalist precedent. This description ties this 
challenge to the prior one: constitutional construction. Both of 
these major, outstanding challenges hinge on the practical fact 
that our written Constitution’s original meaning does not 
account for key components of and large quantities of American 
 
 31. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 773 (suggesting that original 
closure rules eliminate potential underdeterminacy and, hence, the need for 
constitutional construction).  
 32. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 65, 71–72 (2011) (offering a brief rejoinder to McGinnis and Rappaport); 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 
95, 105 n.21 (2010–2011) (responding to McGinnis and Rappaport in a footnote, and 
noting that “complete treatment is outside the scope of this Essay”).  
 33. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 32, at 103–08 (providing an explanation of 
construction as “giv[ing] legal effect to the semantic content of a legal text”).  
 34. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and 
Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The 
Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007); Kurt T. Lash, 
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); 
Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It 
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of 
Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. 
REV. 419 (2006).  
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constitutional law.35 For both the issue of construction and the 
issue of nonoriginalist precedent, originalists face the same 
tensions: maintain originalism’s distinctiveness or lose it; fit the 
Constitution’s original meaning or fit the practice more broadly. 
The broad, international cadre of originalist contributors 
shows that originalism faces many of these same challenges and 
criticisms in countries with different legal systems and historical 
circumstances. For instance, Bradley Miller’s essay shows that, 
for originalism to succeed in Canada, it must grapple with and 
synthesize Edwards v. AG Canada, commonly known as the 
Persons Case36 (pp. 120–46). The Persons Case is Canada’s 
Brown v. Board of Education37 because it is a key case in the 
canon38 of Canadian constitutional law. The Persons Case is 
widely viewed as reaching a just result via a nonoriginalist 
methodology (pp. 120–21). Miller argues that the Persons Case is 
actually an example of original meaning originalism and, 
therefore, originalism can reach the necessary just result (pp. 
122–44). Miller relies on the concept of constitutional 
construction and shows that the key term, “person,” was 
ambiguous, and that originalism permitted a just construction of 
the term (pp. 138–44). 
Similarly, Grant Huscroft describes another common 
nonoriginalist move (pp. 203–22). In Canada, as in the United 
States, nonoriginalists frequently argue that constitutional text 
is—intentionally or not—vague because of its high level of 
generality, and that originalism is therefore inappropriate for 
such texts. In arguments that echo those leveled against Jack 
Balkin,39 Huscroft argues that bills of rights in general, and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in particular, “reflect 
the bargaining and compromise that was required in order to 
attain the political consent necessary to entrench it in the 
constitutional order” (p. 204). Therefore, bills of rights are 
“finite,” and originalism offers a principled means for judges to 
acknowledge and follow that finiteness (pp. 204–05, 218). 
 
 35. Strang, supra note 34, at 430–32.  
 36. Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) [more 
commonly known as the Persons Case].  
 37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 38. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of Constitutional 
Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998).  
 39. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737 (criticizing Professor Balkin’s “preference for abstract 
interpretations”).  
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IV. ORIGINALISM’S CONTINUING ALLURE: THE 
CHALLENGE POSED BY WRITTENNESS 
If ever a theory of constitutional interpretation faced 
challenges, it is originalism.40 Demographically, originalists have 
been and continue to be a relatively small portion of the legal 
academy.41 As a matter of brute practical fact, much of current 
American constitutional law and interpretative practice is in 
tension with the Constitution’s original meaning.42 As 
importantly, originalism has been, since it first took the stage, the 
recipient of continual—and frequently highly-sophisticated—
criticism.43 The Challenge of Originalism prompts the question of 
why originalism—despite these and other challenges44—has not 
only not died a quiet death: it has flourished. 
There are a number of reasons for originalism’s continuing 
allure; I will focus on one that closely fits the essays in The 
Challenge of Originalism: the fact of the Constitution’s written-
ness.45 This fact, more than anything else, I think, accounts for 
originalism’s staying power. Pointing to the Constitution’s 
writtenness as an important facet of originalism’s pull is not new. 
Though scholars across the interpretative spectrum have made 
this point,46 the essays in The Challenge of Originalism exemplify 
 
 40. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 24, at 89–90 (“The received wisdom among law 
professors is that originalism in any form is dead, having been defeated in intellectual 
combat sometime in the 1980s.”).  
 41. See Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical 
Possibilities and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 279–88 (2011) 
(describing the relationship between political outlook and interpretative method); see 
also John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions by 
Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1170 (2005) (finding that “81% of law 
faculty members in the study who make political contributions contribute wholly or 
predominately to Democrats”); Symposium, Curricular Stress, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 110, 
112 (2010) (“To be sure, many law professors—probably a substantial majority—have 
liberal rather than conservative political views . . . .”).  
 42. Strang, supra note 34, at 430–32.  
 43. Professor Solum details originalism’s evolution in response to criticism (pp. 16–
29).  
 44. For instance, Americans prefer at least some nonoriginalist precedents and 
doctrines over the original meaning.  
 45. The Constitution’s writtenness also plays a central role in originalist thought 
outside the essays in The Challenge of Originalism. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 24, at 
91 (“Once the importance of text or ‘writtenness’ is conceded, some version of 
originalism becomes must harder to resist.”); WHITTINGTON, supra note 24, at 47 
(defending the “claim that an originalist interpretive approach is somehow required by 
the very fact that the United States has a written constitution”); see also Andrew B. 
Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
1025, 1027–28 (2010) (describing the widespread originalist appeal to the Constitution’s 
writtenness).  
 46. As Professor Berman summarizes the nonoriginalist perspective, “the original 
public meaning of the constitutional text and the original semantic intentions of its 
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the tight connection between originalism and written con-
stitutionalism. 
Professor Solum’s initial essay47 describes originalism’s two 
core theses, both of which are predicated on the Constitution’s 
writtenness (pp. 32–38). Professor Goldsworthy’s essay is 
likewise predicated on a written constitution.48 Professor Miller’s 
essay seeks to reconcile, in the Canadian context, originalism’s 
fealty to constitutional text with the claims of justice presented 
in the Persons Case (pp. 120–22). 
The Constitution’s writtenness also accounts for major 
intra-originalist disputes, such as the debate between original 
intent and original meaning originalists. Both sides in this debate 
contend that they are more faithful to how one does and should 
interpret written documents, like the Constitution. For example, 
Larry Alexander contends that original intent best accounts for 
Americans’ fealty to the written document in the national 
archives49 (pp. 93–94). Similarly, Stanley Fish’s argument is text-
centric: “My answer to the question ‘What is the meaning of a 
text?’ is simple and categorical: A text means what its author or 
authors intend” (p. 100). 
Grégoire Webber’s essay, “Originalism’s Constitution,” 
focuses on the relationship between originalism and its “subject 
matter of interpretation,” which, Webber argues, “cannot so 
easily be divorced from an interpretative approach” (p. 150). 
Webber concludes that originalism has three core commitments, 
including that an originalist constitution “is written”50 (p. 151). 
Grant Huscroft makes a similar move in the Canadian context 
by arguing that adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms has the interpretative consequence that the adopted 
rights are the only rights constitutionally protected because “bills 
 
authors are relevant” (p. 248). See also p. 250 (“Virtually nobody denies that the original 
meaning of a constitutional provision is always relevant to the interpretative task, and 
few theorists deny that it is frequently a weighty consideration.”).  
 47. Professor Solum’s other work, especially his unpublished paper, also rests on 
the Constitution’s writtenness. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 (last updated Nov. 25, 2008).  
 48. See also Whittington (p. 71) (summarizing his view that “originalism is the best 
approach to interpreting a written constitution”).  
 49. See also Larry Alexander, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 1–5 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (making a similar point); Kay, supra note 
11, at 29–30 (same).  
 50. Webber also plays out implications of originalism’s need for writtenness: the 
original constitution’s meaning is tied to a particular historical event (p. 152); the original 
constitution’s text is a fixed reference for constitutional meaning (p. 153); and the 
original constitution’s text’s meaning is “discoverable as a ‘social fact’” (p. 153).  
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of rights are finite instruments” (p. 204). Relatedly, James Allan 
contends that, based on the reasons a polity would adopt a 
written constitution in the first instance, “originalism is the least 
bad (or, in that sense, the best) approach to interpreting it” (p. 
181). 
Conversely, originalism’s critics in The Challenge of 
Originalism question whether the Constitution’s writtenness 
leads to the originalists’ conclusions. For instance, Professor 
Berman tentatively proffers a “complex” theory of constitutional 
interpretation that would have places for “arguments of text” 
and of original meaning, and that gives these and other reasons 
different weights, but which would not give original meaning 
conclusive weight (pp. 275–77). Professor Bix questions whether 
originalism can plausibly apply to all constitutions or is limited to 
the U.S. Constitution (pp. 292–98). 
In addition to being addressed by the essays, the 
Constitution’s writtenness also accounts for the continuing 
discussion over the two challenges to originalism I earlier 
identified: the role of constitutional construction and the 
viability of nonoriginalist precedent. One of constitutional con-
struction’s key characteristics is that it identifies the limits to the 
text’s reach: the limits to the written Constitution’s power to 
bind. Originalists currently fracture on the extent of the 
Constitution’s constraint on constitutional construction.51 
Similarly, nonoriginalist precedent presents originalists with the 
conflict between the written Constitution and contrary Supreme 
Court pronouncements. Originalists have also not achieved 
consensus on how to resolve that conflict.52 
Professor Smith’s essay, described above,53 worries that 
originalism’s sophistication may lead to exclusion of all but the 
most stout hearted from the debate and the possible dissolution 
of originalism itself (pp. 227–33). I suggested earlier that 
sophistication may not result in exclusion, or that potential 
exclusion may be a cost worth bearing, and that it is not clear 
that sophistication will lead to dissolution. Let me now suggest 
that the sophistication so ably displayed in The Challenge of 
 
 51. See Solum, supra note 8, at 166–68 (describing how originalists have different 
views on the constraint the Constitution’s original meaning imposes on constitutional 
construction).  
 52. See sources cited, supra note 34 (providing a selection of the contending 
approaches).  
 53. Supra Part II.A. 
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Originalism is the result of our commitment to a written 
constitution. 
Texts that play central roles in human culture, practices, and 
institutions, accumulate around them ever-more sophisticated 
engagement with those texts. Returning to Smith’s analogy to 
religion, Christians’ and Christianity’s engagement with the 
Bible, from its inception, grew in complexity. Christians, for 
example, grappled with (their understanding of) the nature of 
Jesus Christ, and his relationship to God the Father and Holy 
Spirit, only after facing new historical and theological 
circumstances that the Bible did not—at least not 
perspicaciously—answer.54 As Christianity more fully articulated 
the doctrine of the Trinity, both the doctrine itself and the 
arguments supporting it, created a complex intellectual 
architecture.55 
The Constitution’s central role in American cultural, 
political, and legal life make similar sophistication of 
constitutional law and interpretation inevitable. Americans care 
about how and what the Constitution means, and increased 
sophistication is one result of attempts to answer those 
questions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Challenge of Originalism is accessible to the newly-
initiated while remaining worthwhile for those deeply engaged in 
the debates over originalism. The Challenge of Originalism 
showcases the broad appeal of originalism and the subtlety with 
which its proponent and opponents engage. The Challenge of 
Originalism also displays the centrality of the Constitution’s 
writtenness to originalism. Lastly, The Challenge of Originalism 
reminds us that there remains a great deal for originalists to do, 
especially further explanation of constitutional construction and 
the status of nonoriginalist precedent. 
 
 54. See NEWMAN, supra note 14, at 14–21 (describing the background and 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity).  
 55. See, e.g., SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, QQ. 27–43 
(Benziger Bros. ed., Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947) (1273) 
(explaining the now-complex doctrine of the Trinity).  
